Location is the feature that makes proximity-based apps work and it is also their largest privacy weakness. Distance displayed to a nearby user is not a vague indication; combined from several points it can identify a specific building.
How does that work?
If an app tells several users how far away you are, and those users are in known positions, the overlapping distances narrow to a small area. Doing this from three positions locates someone with considerable precision. This is not theoretical: researchers have repeatedly demonstrated it against major platforms, and several have since added protections.
Who does this matter to?
Anyone who is not out, anyone who could be targeted for harassment or violence, anyone in a country where same-sex activity is criminalised, and anyone with a specific reason to avoid being found, including people who have left abusive relationships. For many users it is a minor concern; for some it is a serious one.
What can you do about it?
Most apps offer an option to hide your distance, and some allow you to show an approximate area rather than a figure. Turning distance off reduces how many people see you, which is the trade. If you have any reason to be concerned, it is worth accepting that cost.
What about app permissions?
Check what the app is allowed to access on your phone: precise versus approximate location, photographs, contacts and background activity. Many apps request considerably more than they need. Granting approximate rather than precise location, where your phone allows it, reduces the resolution of anything that leaks.
Does it matter where you open the app?
Yes, and it is worth thinking about. Opening it only at home means your home is the location associated with you. Opening it in varied places makes any single reading less informative. Avoid opening it somewhere that identifies you, such as a workplace.
What about the data itself?
Apps hold location histories, message content and profile information, and several have had significant breaches or have been found sharing data with third parties. Assume that what you put into an app exists somewhere beyond your control. Using an email address not connected to your name, and not linking social media accounts, limits what a breach reveals.
What about abroad?
Considerably more serious in countries where same-sex activity is criminalised, where apps have been used for entrapment and where phones have been searched at borders. Turning off distance, removing identifying photographs, or deleting the app entirely for the trip are all reasonable, and some apps offer a discreet icon and passcode lock.
Can you tell if someone is using this against you?
Rarely, which is part of the problem. What you can do is notice patterns: someone who seems to know where you are, turns up somewhere unexpectedly, or refers to your movements. That is worth taking seriously and reporting, and Galop supports LGBT people experiencing stalking and harassment.
Does turning off distance stop everything?
No. It removes the most precise mechanism and does not remove the fact that you appear in a local grid. Someone in your building will still see you. Privacy here is a matter of degrees rather than a setting you can switch on.
What is worth doing today?
Open your settings, hide your distance if you have any reason to, check what permissions the app has, and make sure your photographs are not reusable elsewhere.
Do all apps handle this the same way?
No. Some have added protections after researchers demonstrated the problem, including limiting precision and offering to hide distance by default in certain countries. Others have done less. It is worth looking at what your app actually offers rather than assuming there is nothing available.
What about VPNs?
They change your apparent internet location and do not change what the app reports from your phone's location services, so they do not solve this. They have other uses and are not a fix for proximity data.